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Article
THE INDEPENDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
THOMAS I. VANASK1E*
"To consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional ques-
tions [is] a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place
us under the despotism of an oligarchy."
-Thomas Jefferson'
I. INTRODUCTION
T homas Jefferson's sentiment reflects a concern for the potential usur-
pation of power inherent in a branch of the national government in-
dependent of democratically established executive and legislative
hegemony. And yet, it is unbridled executive and legislative authority that
threatens to overwhelm the constitutional limits of power, as well as the
individual rights proclaimed as "self-evident" in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and assured by the Bill of Rights. Thus, there exists an inherent
tension in assigning to the judicial branch of government the final say as
to the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. The judiciary
cannot be so independent that it becomes a despotic oligarchy, but it must
be sufficiently independent of the legislature and the executive that it re-
mains, in James Madison's words, an "impenetrable bulwark" both against
the exercise of authority not delegated to the other branches of national
government or reserved to the states, as well as against unwarranted en-
croachments on individual rights. 2
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania; B.A., 1975, Lycoming College; J.D., 1978, Dickinson School of Law.
1. 15 THIE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 277 (Lipsomb & Bergh eds., Me-
morial Ed. 1903-04), available at http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/
jeffH030.htm (quoting statement made by ThomasJefferson to William C. Jarvis in
1820).
2. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (quoting James
Madison's statement that addition of national judiciary would safeguard against
abuse of power by any single branch of national government).
(745)
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That the judiciary has attained the degree of institutional indepen-
dence deemed by some to be "perhaps the most essential characteristic of
a free society"3 is suggested by the fact that the Supreme Court was ac-
knowledged to have the authority to serve as the final arbiter of issues
determinative of the 2000 presidential election. The federal judiciary has
thus evolved from an institution bemoaned by its first Chief Justice, John
Jay, as lacking both the "energy, weight and dignity," as well as "the public
confidence and respect" essential to perform its role in the national gov-
ernment,4 to the one branch of national government with the stature and
security necessary to render a decision that would be accepted by the Na-
tion as final resolution of the election controversy.
It is, however, the content of the majority ruling in Bush v. Gore5 that
has caused some to suggest that the decision portends a diminution in the
Court's stature and an erosion in the independence of the federal judici-
ary. Criticism of the decision has focused on what is perceived to be the
absence of coherent reasoning and the departure of the Bush v. Gore ma-
jority from the positions they previously held on matters of states' rights
and equal protection. 6 As one commentator has noted, "[t]he Court's
unique treatment of both the federal question and its application of the
Equal Protection Clause makes it difficult to conclude that the decision
resulted from a dispassionate application of generally accepted legal prin-
ciples, and highlights the difference between playing lip service to
[S]tates' rights and judicial restraint and actually applying those
principles." 7
This criticism reflects a recognition that to maintain not only its stat-
ure, but also, more importantly, its independence, the judiciary must ad-
here to the discipline ofjudicial decision-making, firmly rooting rulings in
the language of the documents in issue, precedent and logic. That is, the
strength of the judiciary's independence depends not only on the consti-
tutional framework, but also on the extent to which the judiciary acknowl-
edges its responsibility to "decide 'according to law,' according to a
continuity of reasoned principle found in the words of the Constitution,
statute, or other controlling instrument, in the implications of its structure
3. S. Irvin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 108, 121 (1970).
4. Randolph J. May, Better Than Nothing: Why the Judiciary Is Finally Getting the
Respect It Deserves, 112 FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. 6 (2001) (noting thatJohn Jay
declined second term as ChiefJustice because judiciary, at that time, lacked weight
and dignity it needed to be successful).
5. 571 U.S. 98 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Nathaniel Hernandez, Trial Lawyers and Profs Issue Split Opinion on
Federal Election Ruling, 24 CHI. LAw. 8, 8-9, 20 (2001) (noting various criticisms,
including characterization of ruling as "'driven by political concerns rather than
legal concerns"').
7. Clifford B. Levine, Bush v. Gore, Who Exactly Was the Supreme Court Protect-
ing?, LAws. J., Jan. 12, 2001, at 8.
746 [Vol. 46: p. 745
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and apparent purposes, and in prior judicial precedents, traditional un-
derstanding, and like sources of law."8
This Article, based on remarks I made at Lycoming College in April of
2000, will: (1) examine the historical basis for an independent judiciary;
(2) explore the provisions of the United States Constitution intended to
establish an independent third branch of government and, at the same
time, serve as a check on that independence; (3) discuss early challenges
to the autonomy of the federal judiciary and the enduring significance of
the results of those challenges; and (4) review current assaults on the inde-
pendence of the federal judiciary. Although Congress and the President
must assume responsibility to preserve an independent judiciary by, for
example, avoiding calls for impeachment of judges because of particular
decisions, decreeing results in particular controversies, and blocking cost
of living adjustments forjudges, the judiciary must also accept its responsi-
bility by deciding "according to law," with a healthy respect for the policy
prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches and an equally
healthy skepticism of the notion that a judge or group ofjudges can know
what is best on matters of public policy.
9
II. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION FOR AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
In 1215, the Magna Carta advanced the revolutionary principle that
the populace should be subject to the rule of law, not to the whim of the
ruler.10 Even the ruler was to be subject to the law.
As Professor Cox relates, when KingJames IV of Scotland ascended to
the throne of England and became King James the First, he brought with
him the divine right theory of governance, by which the King was regarded
8. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 565, 566 (1996).
9. Most of my remarks at Lycoming College in April 2000 concerned the fed-
eral judiciary, and this article will not deviate from that approach. But judicial
independence is equally important, if not more so, for the judiciary of our nation's
sovereign states. State judges in forty-seven of the fifty states are subject to an elec-
toral process that poses threats to independence which we in the federal judiciary
need not confront. These threats include such matters as the need to raise sub-
stantial sums of money to be elected and to stand for retention. Amassing cam-
paign treasuries casts doubt on the appearance of impartiality that is essential to
maintaining public respect for the judge's decisions. In addition, the electoral
process imposes pressures upon a state courtjudge to conform his or her decisions
to the popular view or risk removal from office in the next election. Conversely, if
the judge rules in a way that is consistent with the popular view, he or she is subject
to the criticism of the disappointed litigant that the decision was the product of
this external factor. Although this Article focuses on the federal judiciary, I do not
mean to suggest that the independence of the state judiciary is any less important
or that the threats to the independence of the state judiciary are less substantial.
10. See Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian ofJudicial Inde-
pendence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 647 (1999).
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as above the law.'1 When a question arose as to whether a lay court (the
common pleas court) 'should decide whether an ecclesiastical court had
jurisdiction over a particular matter, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the
highest ecclesiastical officer next to the King, contended that the judges
were merely subjects of the King, who could remove them at any time.
This position was consistent with the divine right theory. ChiefJustice Ed-
ward Coke had concluded otherwise, explaining that "the King in his own
person cannot adjudge any case . .'. but this ought to be determined and
adjudged in some Court of Justice . . .so that the Court gives the judg-
ment."12 This position would make the judge, and not the King, the final
arbiter of the law. When confronted by KingJames I, ChiefJustice Coke is
reported to have stated that "[t]he King should not be under man, but
under God and the Law." 13 KingJames, adhering to his view that he was
above even the law, removed Lord Coke and other lay judges who would
not yield to his position.
Professor Cox reports that under later Stuart Kings, the appointment
and removal powers were used to enlist judges to successfully prosecute
those who stood in opposition to the monarchy.14 He also reports that
one of the causes of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was the conduct of
the monarchy in destroying the independence of the lay judiciary.15 The
Glorious Revolution of 1688 produced the Act of Settlement of 1701. This
document stipulated that a judge shall serve "as long as he shall behave
himself well." 6 There was thus established the principle of lifetime ten-
ure as a means of precluding the executive from filling and eliminating
judicial posts to ensure a view sympathetic with the monarch.
Indeed, lack of lifetime tenure for colonial judges was an important
factor in the American Revolution. Although judges in England during
this period served so long as they behaved themselves, colonial judges
were subject to removal at the insistence of the King, who did not hesitate
to exercise this authority to keep the colonists in line. 17 Among the Decla-
ration of Independence's litany of grievances was that the King had "made
judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
11. See Cox, supra note 8, at 568 nn.3-4 (noting that King James practiced
divine rights of kingship where judges were his agents and he could withdraw cases
from them at any time).
12. Id. at 569 n.5 (quoting Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1342 (K.B.
1607)).
13. Id. at 569 (quoting Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1343).
14. See id. at 569 n.10.
15. See id. (citing 7 EDWARD Foss, JUDGES OF ENGLAND 200-01 (1966)).
16. Id. at 570 n.12 (citing Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks onjudi-
cial Power in the Era of Managerial judging, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 41, 47 (1995))
(quoting The Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 2, c. 2, § 3 (1700) (Eng.)).
17. See id. at 570 n.13 (noting that King George retained and did exercise
authority to remove judges); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of
Restraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969,
1970 (1988) (same).
[Vol. 46: p. 745
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amount and payment of their salaries." 18 Thus, an independentjudiciary,
free of executive oppression, was regarded by the American revolutionar-
ies as essential to a free society.
The need for an independent judiciary was reinforced by the experi-
ence under the Articles of Confederation. The initial concept had been
that democratically elected legislatures would control the judiciaries of
each state. Having judges independent from the people was deemed in-
imical to the democratic spirit of the American Revolution, but the ab-
sence of restraint on legislative control over the judiciary was soon
recognized to be a greater problem. As reported by Stephen Burbank:
[A] decade of experience under the state constitutions . . .ex-
pose[d] [a] triple danger[:] ... first, that abuse of legislative
power was more ominous than arbitrary acts of the executive; sec-
ond, that the true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled
from the rulers than to defend minorities and individuals against
factious popular majorities acting through government; and
third, that agencies of central government were less dangerous
than 'state and local despotisms. 19
Burbank further observed that Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
came to "'a substantive conception of the judiciary as the third branch of
government.' 20 Madison and Hamilton thought that the judiciary would
be essential to maintain a separation of powers between the Legislature
and the President. 2 .
EvenJefferson appears to have been affected by the legislative usurpa-
tion of judicial power during the Articles of Confederation period. Al-
though it is said that in 1777 Jefferson had remarked that "the judiciary
should 'be a mere machine' for the legislature, '22 in 1784 he wrote:
[Under the Virginia constitution, t]he judiciary . ..members
were left dependent on the legislature, for their subsistence in
office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If therefore
the legislature assumes .. .judiciary powers, no opposition is
likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in
that case they may put their proceedings into the form of an act
of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other
18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
19. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture ofJudicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 315, 319 (1999) (quotingJACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 290 (1996)).
20. Id. at 320 (quoting RAKOvE, supra note 19, at 299).
21. See id.
22. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Origins and History of Federal Judicial Indepen-
dence, in A.B.A. COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS ANDJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY app. A at 67, 69 (1997), available at http://www.abanet.org-
govaffairs/judiciary/rappa html.
2001] 749
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branches. They have accordingly, in many instances, decided
rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy. 23
The concern expressed by Jefferson reflected views that had been
stated earlier by John Adams and Montesquieu. The judicial power, said
Adams, "'ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and
independent upon both, so that it may be a check upon both.' 24 That is,
there must be "institutional" judicial independence. "Montesquieu ob-
served [that] rendering judges independent of outside influence, would
allow them to 'follow the letter of the law' in the course of trying the
causes of individuals," 25 that is, "decisional judicial independence." 26
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN INDEPENDENT
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Three provisions of Article III of the United States Constitution are
generally regarded as the foundation for federal judicial independence in
the United States. The first is the so-called vesting clause, which states that
"[t] he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." 27 The language of this section parallels that found
in Section 1 of Article I-"all legislative [p] owers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States," 28 and Section 1 of Article
II-"the executive Power shall be vested in a president of the United States
of America." 29 By this use of parallel expressions in each of the first three
Articles of the Constitution, the Founding Fathers suggested that the three
branches of the national government were to be co-equals.
The Constitution establishes only the Supreme Court of the United
States, leaving the creation and organization of "inferior" federal courts to
Congress. This arrangement has significant implications on the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. The implications are best understood in the con-
text of the Constitutional Convention debates surrounding the drafting of
Article III.
The resolution establishing the federal judicial power originally pro-
vided simply that a national judiciary be established, without mentioning a
supreme or lower courts. 30 This resolution was then amended to state,
23. Id. (quoting GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 451 (1969) (quoting Thomas Jefferson)).
24. Id. at 68 (citing John Adams, On Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHN AnD-
AMS 181, 198 (C. Adams ed., 4th ed. 1851-56)).
25. Id. at 68-69 (quoting C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws, Book X,
sec. 6, at 152 (T. Nugent trans., 1949)).
26. Id. (citing Adams, supra note 24, at 198).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
30. See Geyh, supra note 22, at 73.
[Vol. 46: p. 745
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"Resolved that a National judiciary be established, to consist of one su-
preme tribunal and of one or more inferior tribunals."3 1 The Anti-Feder-
alists objected to the amendment, arguing that "the State tribunals might
and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance," and that
lower federal courts would make "an unnecessary encroachment on the
jurisdiction [of the states]. "32 The Anti-Federalist view initially prevailed.
An amendment was then proposed, providing "that the National Legisla-
ture be empowered to institute inferior tribunals."33 As reported by
Charles Gardner Geyh, the notes ofJames Madison indicate that the dele-
gates to the constitutional convention observed a distinction "between es-
tablishing such [lower] tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the
Legislature to establish or not establish them."34
This compromise, extending to Congress the discretionary authority
to determine the structure and number of the "inferior courts" of the na-
tion, has enabled Congress to control both the organization and, to some
extent, the jurisdiction of the federal courts. As the United States Su-
preme Court has more than once stated:
[T]he judicial power of the United States . . . is (except in enu-
merated instances, applicable exclusively to this Court) dependent
for its distribution, organization, and... exercise, entirely upon the ac-
tion of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating the tribu-
nals (inferior to the Supreme Court) . . . and of investing them
with jurisdiction ... and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character to which Congress may seem
proper for the public good. 35
Exercise of judicial power by the federal judiciary is also constrained
in large measure by the congressional determination of the kinds of cases
that can be heard in federal court. Congressional control over the organi-
zation and jurisdiction of the federal courts impacts the federal judiciary's
constitutional role as a check upon executive and legislative authority. In
this respect, Congress's exercise of its constitutional prerogatives in the
31. Id. (quoting 3 MAX FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 104-05 (1937) (quoting notes of James Madison)).
32. Id. (quoting 3 FARRANO, supra note 31, at 104-05 (quoting notes of James
Madison)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (emphasis added)
(quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. 236, 245 (1845)); see also Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1973) ("The decision with respect to [the creation of] fed-
eral courts, as well as the task of deciding their jurisdiction, was left to the discre-
tion of Congress); Case of Sewing Mach. Co., 85 U.S. 553, 577-78 (1873) ("Federal
judicial power, beyond all doubt, has its origin in the Constitution, but the organiza-
tion of the system and the distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction among such inferior
courts . .. always have been, and of right must be the work of the Congress." (emphasis
added)).
2001]
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organization and jurisdiction of the federal courts impacts the judiciary's
institutional independence. 36
The second provision essential to the establishment of federal judicial
independence is the good behavior clause of Section 1 of Article III, which
provides that "the Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour. '37 This provision has as its his-
torical antecedents the Act of Settlement of 1701, the experience of the
colonists under King George 1II, and, the state legislatures' control ofjudi-
ciaries under the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton, in The Federalist No.
78, argued that life tenure was essential to the institutional independence
of the judiciary, stating:
If then the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks
of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this
consideration [life time tenure] will afford a strong argument for
the permanent tenure ofjudicial officers, since nothing will con-
tribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges
which must be essential to the faithful performance of so ardu-
ous a duty. 38
The independence that comes with life tenure was, however, checked
by congressional authority to remove judges. Initially, it was proposed that
judges "may be removed by the Executive on the application [by] the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives." 39 This proposal was soundly rejected
as it portended a repeat of the experience of legislative control of state
judiciaries during the Articles of Confederation period.40 In its stead,
judges were made subject to the constitutional provision on impeachment
of "all civil Officers of the United States" for "Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors." '4 1
The third provision key to federal judicial independence is the com-
pensation clause of Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, which pro-
vides that judges of the Supreme and inferior courts shall "receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office."4 2 Manipulation ofjudicial salaries had been
a means to control the judiciary exercised by both kings and state legisla-
36. See Geyh, supra note 22, at 68 (noting that inquiry into judiciary's inde-
pendence requires exploration beyond text of Article III, Section 1 of
Constitution).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 53 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord
Bourne ed., 1937).
39. Geyh, supra note 22, at 70 (quoting 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428 (1937)).
40. See id. (quoting 2 FARRAND, supra note 39, at 428).
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
[Vol. 46: p. 745
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tures. 43 The power to determine one's wages was, acknowledged to be a
power to control. As Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 79.
Next to the permanency in office, nothing can contribute more
to the independence of judges than a fixed provision for their
support. . . . A POWER OVER A MAN'S SUBSISTENCE
AMOUNTS TO A POWER OVER HIS WILL. And we can never
hope to see realized in practice the complete separation of the
judicial from the legislative power in any system which leaves the
former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional
grants of the latter.44
The ratification debates continued to reflect the division in position
on the degree of independence to be accorded the national judiciary.
The Anti-Federalists considered ajudicial branch vested with the exclusive
power to decide cases, assured of lifetime tenure and at least a fixed com-
pensation, as a pernicious, anti-democratic instrument that could frustrate
the will of the people. The Anti-Federalist papers asserted:
U]udges under this system will be independent in the strict sense
of the word .... [T] here is no power above them that can con-
trol their decisions, or correct their errors. There is no authority
that can remove them from office for any errors or want of capac-
ity, or lower their salaries, and in many cases their power is supe-
rior to that of the legislature. 45
In light of this, Anti-Federalists argued that "[i]f... the legislature pass
any laws inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitution,
they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect their power is supe-
rior to that of the legislature,' 46 the democratically elected governing
body. The Anti-Federalists also recognized the potential for the federal
judiciary to overwhelm its state counterparts, proclaiming that Section 1 of
Article III would enable "the courts appointed by this new-fangled Con-
gress [to] eat up our courts .... -47 The Federalists countered these argu-
ments by pointing out that the jurisdiction of the state courts was
unaffected by the proposed Constitution; that lifetime tenure and assured
compensation were essential to provide ajudiciary with sufficient indepen-
dence to oppose legislative and executive excesses, given the judicial
branch's "lack of control over sword or purse;" and that the legislature's
43. See Geyh, supra note 22, at 72 (describing manipulation of salaries as "con-
crete, widely acknowledged problem").
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord
Bourne ed., 1937).
45. Geyh, supra note 22, at 75 (quoting Brutus, The Power of the Judiciary (Part
I), Mar. 20, 1788, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 222, 223-24 (Morton Borden ed.,
1965)).
46. Id. at 76 (quoting Brutus, supra note 45, at 223-24).
47. Id. at 75 (quoting Speech by Benjamin Gale, in III DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 420, 428 (Nov. 12, 1787)).
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power of impeachment protected against a judiciary usurping legislative
or executive power.
4s
As summarized by Geyh:
In the end, a study of the convention and ratification debates
tells us that the framers intended for the judiciary to be one of
three, coequal branches of government. It tells us that the foun-
ders gave federal judges life tenure and a salary that could not be
diminished, to guarantee that the judiciary would have decisional
and institutional independence. It tells us that the framers
prized decisional and institutional independence, respectively, as
means to ensure impartial judicial decision-making and to avoid
over-concentrations of power in a single branch of government.
Finally, it tells us that impeachment and removal was the primary
check on judicial independence, and was thought to be an ap-
propriate remedy forjudicial usurpations of power and other po-
litical crimes. 49
IV. EARLY ATTACKS ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY'S INDEPENDENCE
One of the first acts of Congress after the national government was
established in 1789 was enactment of legislation creating the national judi-
ciary.50 Under this legislation, the Supreme Court was assigned six jus-
tices. They were given circuit-riding responsibilities, meaning that they
had to travel to various parts of the United States and sit as trial judges and
judges of intermediate appeal. 5 1 When decisions made by a Supreme
Court justice as a trial judge reached the Supreme Court, that justice ei-
ther had to disqualify himself or pass judgment upon his own work.52 The
justices had complained about the circuit-riding responsibility.
In 1801, the lame duck President, John Adams, with a lame duck Fed-
eralist Congress, passed the Judiciary Act of 1801. 5 3 This legislation ended
the circuit riding responsibilities for Supreme Court justices and created
sixteen new circuit judge positions to assume the responsibilities previ-
ously discharged by the Supreme Court justices.5 4 Jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit courts, as permitted by the Constitution, was extended to all cases
arising under the Constitution, treaties or federal law, thus establishing a
48. Id. at 76-77.
49. Id. at 78.
50. SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (repealed 1911) (establishing court
with one Chief Justice and five Associate Justices, meeting two sessions annually
and having thirteen judicial districts).
51. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered
Branch, 1801-1805, at 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 219, 222 (1998).
52. See id. (describing judicial practice prior to Judiciary Act of 1801).
53. 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
54. See Currie, supra note 51, at 222.
[Vol. 46: p. 745
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comprehensive scheme for the adjudication of federal law issues.5 5 It cer-
tainly seems like sensible legislation.5 6 But the problem was that the lame
duck Congress filled the sixteen new judgeships with Federalists. 57
Thomas Jefferson assumed the office of the Presidency in 1801.
When Congress convened in December of 1801, Jefferson asked that it
"consider whether the country really needed all those new judges," recog-
nizing congressional control over the organization and structure of the
federal judiciary. 58 In early 1802, legislation was introduced to repeal the
Judiciary Act of 1801. 5 9 There ensued a vigorous debate over the constitu-
tionality of the proposed repeal of the legislation, which would abolish
courts established by that legislation and, in effect, remove judges from
office notwithstanding the Constitution's guarantee of lifetime tenure.
The repeal would also reinstate the Supreme Court Justices' circuit-riding
responsibilities. The Jeffersonian Republicans, now in control of Con-
gress, asserted that it had the same right to repeal the law establishing
inferior courts that it had to repeal the law establishing post offices or the
levying of taxes. 60 They asserted "an absolute, uncontrolled right to abol-
ish all offices which have been created by Congress, when ... those offices
are unnecessary and are productive of a useless expense." 61 This view pre-
vailed by a slim margin in the Senate and the repeal legislation passed
overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives. 62 The sixteen newly ap-
pointed judges were effectively thrown out of office. A purge of the judici-
ary had been accomplished.
The constitutionality of the repeal legislation was never explicitly ad-
dressed by the federal courts.63 In Stuart v. Laird,64 the Court rejected a
litigant's contention that Congress could not effect a transfer of a case by
abolishing the court in which the action had been pending, observing:
Congress ha[s] constitutional authority to establish from time to
time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper; and to
55. SeeJudiciary Act of 1801, § 11 (creating jurisdiction for circuit courts over
all crimes "cognizable under the authority of the United States").
56. See Currie, supra note 51, at 222 n.10 (suggesting that Judiciary Act had
been considered "'one of the best and ablest measures ever devised' by the Feder-
alists" (quoting 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 51, 53
(1919))).
57. See id. at 223.
58. Id.
59. See id. (noting that, four weeks after Congress first met in December 1801,
legislation was introduced to repeal act).
60. See id. at 224 (noting that Jeffersonian Republicans argued that Congress
was not required to establish lower federal courts).
61. Geyh, supra note 22, at 82 (quoting CHARLES S. HYNEMAN & GEORGE W.
CAREY, A SECOND FEDERALIST 199 (1967) (quoting Representative Joseph
Nicholson)).
62. See Currie, supra note 51, at 233.
63. See id. at 234; Geyh, supra note 22, at 82.
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
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transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another. In this last
particular, there are no words in the Constitution to prohibit or
restrain the exercise of legislative power.65
The Court also rejected the contention that its members had "no right to
sit as circuit judges, not being appointed as such .... ,66 Having acqui-
esced to circuit-riding before the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1801,
the Court conceded that the authority of Congress to require circuit-rid-
ing had effectively been established.6 7 Thus, the Court acknowledged the
constitutional authority of Congress to control the organization of the
courts and, to some extent, the responsibilities of the members of the
courts.
The repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 demonstrates the tenuous na-
ture of the institutional independence of the federal judiciary. The fact
that courts can be abolished without violating the lifetime tenure clause
suggests a strong check on the exercise of judicial power.
In addition to exercising control over the judiciary by the authority to
determine its structure and organization, Congress and President Jeffer-
son also sought to exert their authority over the judiciary through the im-
peachment power. Although the most famous case dealt with the failed
effort to remove Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, his impeachment
was preceded by the impeachment and successful removal of federal Judge
John Pickering of New Hampshire. Judge Pickering's removal reflected
the potential of the impeachment power as a means of removing members
of the federal judiciary in the absence of criminal conduct.
Judge Pickering had, at one time, been regarded as one of New
Hampshire's most distinguished citizens. However, dementia and alcohol-
ism rendered him a lamentable figure.6 8 A group of citizens complained
of his judicial behavior, and the House of Representatives voted to im-
peach him. There were four articles of impeachment, all of which con-
cernedJudge Pickering's handling of a particular case. 69 AllegedlyJudge
Pickering had released a ship to its owner although duties had not been
paid, had acted without hearing all the evidence, had refused to permit an
appeal, and had appeared on the bench in a state of intoxication, "pro-
fanely 'invok[ing] the name of the Supreme Being,"' and committing
other unspecified "'high-crimes and misdemeanors."' 70 However, Judge
65. Id. at 309.
66. Id.
67. See id. It should be noted that Chief Justice Marshall declined to partici-
pate in the decision, having tried the case in his circuit-riding capacity.
68. See Currie, supra note 51, at 238-39 (noting that old age had adversely
affected Judge Pickering's abilities as judge).
69. See id. at 239 (noting that, after an "embarrassing episode on the bench,"
citizens complained to Jefferson about Pickering).
70. Id. at 240 (citing 13 ANNALS OF CONGREss 319-22 (1804)).
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Pickering was not accused of a particular criminal offense. 71 The matter
proceeded to the Senate. When it was moved that the question before the
Senate was whether Judge Pickering was guilty of high crimes and misde-
meanors, the Senate majority struck the reference to high crimes and mis-
demeanors. Instead, the Senators were simply asked whether Pickering
was "guilty as charged."72 Over the vigorous objection of the Federalists
that impeachment for incompetence was not authorized by the Constitu-
tion, the requisite two thirds vote of the Senators was mustered and Judge
Pickering was removed. 73
Flush from having established a precedent to use the impeachment
power to remove a judge on grounds of incompetence, the Jefferson
Republicans, the day after Pickering's removal, voted to impeach Supreme
Court Justice Samuel Chase.74 The articles of impeachment contained
eight counts, based upon remarks made by Justice Chase before two grand
juries, and his handling of the trials of John Fries and James Callendar on
grounds of violations of the Sedition Act.75 Essentially, Justice Chase, an
ardent Federalist, was charged with acting in disregard of the law and in a
patently biased manner. As in the case of Judge Pickering, the crucial
issue in the Justice Chase proceedings was whether the charged conduct
fell within the impeachment authority for high crimes and
misdemeanors. 7
6
There was at that time precedent in England that high crimes and
misdemeanors included "maladministration" of offices'of public trust.7 7
The Founding Fathers, however, had specifically rejected the term malad-
ministration precisely because it could be viewed as authorizing removal of
71. See id. at 240. It should be noted that, in accordance with authority
granted by the Judiciary Act of 1801,Judge Pickering's duties had been assigned to
anotherjudge. See id. at 242 n.162. With the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801,
however, Judge Pickering was returned to the bench. See id. at 242 n.163.
72. Id. at 243 (quoting 13 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 364 (1804)).
73. See id. at 244.
74. See id. at 249.
75. See id. at 250-51.
76. See id. at 252-54 (discussing "open debate" in Congress about exact mean-
ing of "high crimes and misdemeanors"). Professor Raoul Berger has suggested
that the charges against Justice Chase were indeed substantial 'and that he should
have been removed. Professor Berger asserts:
Standing alone, erroneous rulings in the course of a trial merely consti-
tute reversible error and of themselves furnish no grounds for impeach-
ment. But when these rulings consistently run against the accused, when
all doubts are resolved against him, when the rulings are illuminated by
conduct that exhibits the judge's unflagging hostility to the accused, they
go far to demonstrate that the judge, who before trial announced his
determination to "punish" the accused, has bent every ruling to his
preconceived design.
Id. at 257-58 (quoting RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS 235 (1973)).
77. See id. at 247.
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a judge at the pleasure of the Senate.7 8 Thus, as Professor Currie has
pointed out, "[t]o remove a judge even for errors so patent as to amount
to maladministration would contradict the explicit intentions of the Fram-
ers." 79 Ultimately, a number of Jeffersonian Republicans concurred with
this position and refused to convict Chase.8 0
Immediately following this failure to impeach ajudge for his handling
of some cases, constitutional amendments were introduced to lessen the
consensus needed to remove judges. The proposed process would require
only a simple majority vote of both houses of Congress.8 1 These proposed
amendments did not receive substantial support.8 2
The defeat of the attempt to remove Justice Chase established one of
the most enduring principles of our governance: political differences are
not grounds for removing a judge, and displeasure with a judge's rulings
in a particular case is no ground for impeachment. 83 Since that time, al-
though impeachment has been threatened, it has never been used to retal-
iate against ajudge for a particular decision or decisions.8 4 This limitation
78. See id. at 253 (noting that Madison thought maladministration was too
vague and would be equivalent to term at pleasure of Senate).
79. Id. at 255.
80. See id. at 258.
81. See id. at 258-59.
82. See id.
83. See William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Con-
stitution, 85 Nw. U. L, REv. 903, 910 (1991) (discussing enduring effect of Chase
trial). As Chief Justice Rehnquist has explained:
Had the outcome of the Chase trial in the Senate been different, the
independence of the federal judiciary generally, and that of the Supreme
Court more particularly, would have been threatened. All of the charges
against Chase in connection with the Fries trial and the charge to the
Baltimore grand jury, and most of the charges against him arising out of
the Callendar trial, were based on his performance of judicial duties
while on the bench. Had Chase been convicted, it would have been a
relatively short step, though by no means an inevitable one, for Congress
to use impeachment as a method of curbing judges whose rulings did not
please the dominant viewpoint in that body. Chase's acquittal shut the
door on that possibility. Jefferson disgustedly referred to impeachment
as a "scarecrow," and from that time until the present, impeachment has
been confined to charges of flagrant abuse of office-perjury, bribery,
and the like-and not employed as a basis for challenging judicial rulings
on legal issues.
Id.
84. See, e.g., Stephen 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional At-
tacks on the Third Branch, 87 Ky. L.J. 679, 716 n.118 (1999). In addition to the
conviction of Judge Pickering, there have only been six other federal judges im-
peached, convicted and removed from office. In 1861, Tennessee DistrictJudge
West H. Humphreys was removed for inciting a rebellion against the nation; in
1912, Associate Judge Robert W. Archbald of the United States Commerce Court
was removed on bribery charges; in 1936, Judge Halsted Ritter of the Southern
District of Florida was removed for accepting kickbacks and tax evasion; in 1986,
Nevada District Judge Harry E. Claiborne was removed for tax evasion that had
resulted in a felony criminal conviction; in 1989, Judge Alcee Hastings of the
Southern District of Florida was removed for perjury stemming from an indict-
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on the impeachment power thus serves to assure both institutional inde-
pendence-the ability of the judiciary to serve as a check on the powers of
the executive and legislative branches-as well as decisional indepen-
dence-the ability to decide a case without fear of political reprisal.
Executive and legislative assaults on judicial independence waxed and
waned during the ensuing two centuries. One of the more famous exam-
ples was Franklin D. Roosevelt's so-called court-packing plan. Frustrated by
an aging and very conservative Supreme Court majority that continually
struck down New Deal legislation, President Roosevelt, on February 5,
1937, urged Congress to enact legislation to create one new judgeship for
each judge who was more than seventy years old but refused to retire.8 5
Six of the nine Supreme CourtJustices were then more than seventy years
old.8 6 By having the ability to appoint six new Justices, Roosevelt could
assure favorable rulings on his New Deal legislation. Although Roosevelt
had enjoyed a landslide victory in the 1936 election, Congress soundly de-
feated the court-packing plan.87
The overwhelming resistance to the court-packing plan reflected the
strengthening of the independence of the federal judiciary from its fragile
inception. By the mid-twentieth century, the American public considered
the independence of the federal judiciary to be essential to preserving the
rule of law. As Professor Cox has explained, underlying the opposition to
Roosevelt's plan was "the American people's near religious attachment to
constitutionalism and the Supreme Court and their intuitive realization
that packing the court in order to reverse the course of the Court's deci-
sion, would not only destroy its independence, but erode the essence of
constitutionalism."8 8
V. THE VALUE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The independence of the federal judiciary is firmly entrenched in the
culture of our national government and is regarded as serving several im-
portant purposes. First, independence of the federal judiciary insures that
the third branch serves as a check on the executive and legislative
branches. Initially conceived as essential to the maintenance of the rule of
law over the excesses of the executive, judicial independence has assured
that the country's supreme commander is not above the law. It was, after
all, a federal district judge who compelled President Nixon to produce the
ment based on the solicitation of a bribe; and, also in 1989, Mississippi District
Judge Walter L. Nixon was convicted for lying to a federal grand jury investigating
bribery. See id.
85. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 1023-24 (2000).
86. See Cox, supra note 8, at 578 n.50.
87. See Friedman, supra note 85, at 1023 n.5.
88. Cox, supra note 8, at 578.
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Watergate tapes.8 9 Professor Cox was fired as the Watergate special prose-
cutor after he signaled his intention to obtain a judicial ruling that Nixon
was violating a court order by refusing to turn over the Watergate tapes.90
Nixon, however, could take no such action with respect to Judge Sirica,
who issued the order in question.
As the experience during the Articles of Confederation period
demonstrated, oppressive conduct is not limited to the executive branch.
It is therefore essential that the judiciary serve as a check on legislative
excesses. As Alexander Hamilton expressed in The Federalist No. 78:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution . . . which contains certain
specified exceptions to the legislative authority .... Limitations
of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of courts ofjustice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution
void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or priv-
ileges would amount to nothing.9 1
The doctrine of judicial review, established in Marbury v. Madison,9 2
affords to the courts the final say as to the constitutionality of particular
legislation. 93 Only a truly independent judiciary can insure that Congress
has acted in accordance with its limited powers, and not according to the
views of particular interest groups or even the views of the majority of the
population.
Second, judicial independence is also regarded as essential to pre-
serve individual rights and liberties expressed in the Bill of Rights. James
Madison, when introducing the Bill of Rights, argued the following:
[I] ndependent tribunals ofjustice will consider themselves in pe-
culiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an im-
89. See In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 13-14 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom.,
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ordering President Nixon to turn
over Watergate tapes).
90. See Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S.
88, 102 (1994) (depicting events that led to special prosecutor Cox's termination
in conjunction with Watergate). Cox had been appointed by President Nixon to
serve as special prosecutor to lead the Watergate investigations. See id. Nixon or-
dered the firing of Cox after Cox threatened to obtain a judicial ruling that the
President was violating an Order of Court to deliver the infamous Watergate tapes.
See id. Attorney General Elliot Richardson refused to carry out the order to fire
Cox and, instead, resigned. See id. Cox was then fired by the Solicitor General, in
his capacity as Acting Attorney General. See id. This incident came to be known as
the "Saturday Night Massacre." See id; In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 41-42 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (depicting events of "Watergate Scandal").
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 100 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord
Bourne ed., 1937).
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
93. See id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
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penetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally lead to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Consti-
tution by the declaration of rights.
94
This view was eloquently reflected in a Supreme Court opinion striking
down a West Virginia State Board of Education resolution requiring all
teachers and students to participate in the pledge of allegiance. 95 The
Supreme Court wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submit-
ted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.9 6
The notion that natural rights exist is a part of the fabric of our constitu-
tionally limited democracy; maintaining that fabric is the judiciary's re-
sponsibility, not the prerogative of a legislative majority.
Former Justice PennyJ. White of the Tennessee Supreme Court, who
was effectively removed from office in a retention election that she lost
because of particular decisions attributed to her, has cogently articulated
the differences that we could expect in our present political and legal
landscape if the Jefferson Republicans had prevailed in their assault on
the federal judiciary's independence in the early 1800s:
No legislative acts would be subject to judicial review be-
cause ChiefJustice Marshall would have minded the Jefferson ad-
ministration, which characterized Marbury v. Madison as a brazen
attempt by the judiciary to meddle unlawfully in the business of
the executive. Poll taxes, literacy tests, loyalty oaths, political ger-
rymandering, segregated public accommodations, and lynchings
would all have survived because the judiciary would have been
powerless to question, let alone invalidate, the actions of the leg-
islative or executive branches.
Judges, prosecutors, police officers, and defense attorneys
would not have to worry about suppression motions; without judi-
cial independence Mapp v. Ohio would never have been decided.
Federal agents who violated the Constitution in their searches
and seizures historically turned the evidence over to state courts,
or helped state agents do the deed themselves, since the Bill of
94. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 Uoseph Gales ed., 1789).
95. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943)
(describing Board's resolution that considered refusal to salute flag to be act of
insubordination).
96. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
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Rights only applied to federal government action. It certainly
was unpopular, not the will of the people, for the 1961 Supreme
Court to deem those rights, or at least those in the Fourth
Amendment, equally applicable to the states.
Indigents would not have been given counsel except as pro-
vided by state law, because the 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wain-
wright would not have occurred....
Additionally, there would be no hearings to determine the
admissibility of confessions. We could return to circumstances
such as those found in Davis v. North Carolina where officers
prompted confessions by depriving suspects of food and water
and forcing them to run shackled along side police cars....
Many civil cases would be nonexistent, since legislatures
would have subsumed many private and public corporations.
Why? Because the public pressure against the decision reached
in the 1819 case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward [which held that
the states cannot renege on its contractual obligations] would
have been great enough to deter the Supreme Court from en-
forcing the contract clause against state government. In fact,
many historians suggest that in the absence of the Dartmouth Col-
lege case from the Supreme Court waterfront, courts would barely
have civil dockets because private business would have feared the
encroachment of government and would not have dared to in-
vest their capital to build and stimulate our economy. 97
Although Justice White's observations may have historical merit and
emotional appeal, I believe that judicial independence should not be de-
fended primarily on the content of particular decisions. After all, this in-
dependent federal judiciary, so articulately defended by Justice White,
gave us such decisions as Dred Scott v. Sanford,98 which refused to grant
standing to African Americans in federal court.99 It also produced the
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson'0° that validated segrega-
tion in this country for decades. " " Furthermore, from the early 1900s
through 1936, this independent federal judiciary invalidated any legisla-
tion that sought to improve the conditions of labor and to stimulate the
national economy. 10 2
97. Penny J. White, An America Without Judicial Independence, 80 JUDICATURE
174, 175-76 (1997).
98. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
99. See id. at 410-27 (concluding that African Americans were not citizens
under Constitution and, thus, could not sue in contract).
100. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
101. See id. at 552 (upholding Louisiana law that required separate railroad
cars for African Americans and whites).
102. See Thomas I. Vanaskie, Comment, The State Sovereignty Doctrine Since Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery: A New Constitutional Interpretation Under the Com-
merce Clause, 81 DICK. L. REV. 599, 601-03 (1977).
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Now, I suppose one could argue that cases such as Plessy and Dred Scott
reflect the weakness ofjudicial independence in the face of contrary pub-
lic opinion. Certainly, the case could be made thatjudicial approval of the
incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II in isolation
camps reflected acquiescence to the will of the overwhelming majority.10°
It could also be said that the change in position of Chief Justice Hughes
and Justice Roberts, who joined Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo to
overrule existing precedent in order to sustain New Deal legislation in
1937, could be regarded as the product of the coercive influence of
Roosevelt's court-packing plan.1!0
4
The point is that judicial independence cannot be regarded as guar-
anteeing a result in a particular case that is best for the polity as a whole.
There is no doctrine of judicial infallibility, hence decisions like Plessy v.
Ferguson persist. The importance ofjudicial independence cannot be sub-
stantiated by the content of ajudicial opinion or the wisdom of a particu-
lar ruling. Although proponents of court rulings that run against the tide
of public opinion or majority may cite the decisions as proving the virtue
of judicial independence, opponents of those decisions may cite them as
examples of an oligarchical despotism which has no regard for democracy
itself.
103. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (upholding
confinement of Japanese-American citizens in concentration camps during World
War II). The Korematsu decision has been criticized as "one of the Court's most
embarrassing moments, and has been thoroughly repudiated by history." David
Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Pro-
tection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319, 343
(1994).
104. See Michael R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62
TEx. L. REV. 67, 102-03 (1983). Professor Belknap suggests the following:
Even before Roosevelt revealed his plan to pack the Supreme Court in
early 1937, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, who together held
the balance of power on a divided bench, grasped this reality, ended their
cooperation with the more conservative Justices Van Devanter, Suther-
land, McReynolds, and Butler, and permanently aligned themselves with
the Court's three liberals, Justice Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo.
Id. at 102.
The change in position of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts is some-
times referred to as the "switch in time that saved nine." Id. at 102 n.247. The view
that Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts changed their position in response
to Roosevelt's court-packing plan has been criticized as denying
the constitutional jurisprudence of the period any status as a mode of
intellectual discourse having its own internal dynamic[,] ... dismiss[ing]
the efforts of the lawyers defending the constitutionality of New Deal ini-
tiatives as irrelevant and redundant[,] . . .depriv[ing] Hughes and Rob-
erts of a substantial measure of intellectual integrity and personal dignity,
and... suggest[ing] that sophisticated legal thinkers casually discarded a
jurisprudential world view formed over the course of a lifetime simply
because it became momentarily inconvenient politically.
Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201, 206 (1994).
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Consider, for example, the criticism of Professor Lino Graglia in an
article discussing judidal activism."1 5 Professor Graglia has written that it
is the "occupational disease of life-tenured federal judges" to "exaggerate
their estimation of their own wisdom and goodness in comparison to that
of others."10 6 Professor Graglia further asserts that, since the Warren
Court of the 1950s and 1960s, "the nation has moved from the constitu-
tional scheme to a system of government in accordance with the views of a
small cultural and educational elite, many of, whom take an adversarial
position towards American traditions and institutions."10 7 Blame for this
development is not attributed to the fact that our constitutional scheme
places limits on democracy, but rather on judicial activism, which Graglia
defines as "the practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by other
government officials or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly
prohibit."' 0 Graglia complains that the consequence of judicial activism
has been to subject the American people to the "policy preferences of the
cultural elite on the far left of the American political spectrum." 0 9 Pro-
fessor Graglia continues:
Whatever the policy issue-flag burning, prayer in the schools,
aid to religious schools, pornography, capital punishment, crimi-
nal procedure, busing for school racial balance, and so on-the
ACLU almost always is better off when the Supreme Court takes
the issue out of the political process. The ACLU either obtains a
policy decision unavailable in the political process because it is
opposed by a majority of the American people, or is left with the
status quo and the opportunity to try again in the Court on an-
other day. For conservatives-people who would protect and
preserve American traditional values and institutions-the situa-
tion is reversed; their best hope is not for a positive victory, for
example, a ruling that the States must prohibit abortion, or must
provide for prayer in the schools-but that the Justices can be
induced to leave them free to continue to fight for these posi-
tions through the political process. 1 10
Professor Graglia's commentary harken3 back to the vigorous debates
over the doctrine of judicial review and judicial independence at the
founding of the Republic, reflecting the tension that necessarily exists in a
constitutional scheme that assigns to each branch of government a respon-
sibility to act as a check on the others. No one branch is assured of the
105. See Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial Activism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 293, 294 (1996) (characterizing Supreme Court as "nine
lawyers" that serve as "mouthpiece of cultural elite").
106. Id. at 294.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 296.
109. Id. at 298.
110. Id.
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ability to make the correct decision for society or even a decision that re-
flects the will of the majority, even assuming that the majority will can be
ascertained with assurance. But each branch must act within the confines
of its constitutionally assigned responsibilities. In this manner, the rule of
law that undergirds the Constitution is preserved.
In other words, what is imperative is that the American people have
confidence that each branch of government has retained the ability to
serve as a check and balance on the others. If the legislative and executive
branches could assure certain decisions by having the authority to remove
judges, what confidence would the public have in the judiciary serving its
constitutional role as a check on the excesses of those branches? Jefferson
himself stated the following in 1776:
The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the
morals of the people and every blessing of society depend so
much upon an upright and skillful administration ofjustice, that
the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative
and executive and independent upon both, that so it may be a
check upon both, as both should be checks upon that.''I
In this sense, therefore, institutional independence of the judiciary
must be maintained, even if it produces decisions perceived as contrary to
the majority will. Criticisms of judicial independence as producing anti-
majoritarian rule ignore the fact that, at its inception and throughout its
existence, there has been popular support for this necessary consequence
of having three coequal branches of government. Roosevelt could not
pack the Supreme Court with justices sympathetic to his view. Jefferson
could not remove Justice Chase simply because Chase was an ardent Fed-
eralist who had allowed his political views to enter into his judicial role.
Thus, while a given decision may be anti-majoritarian, the potential for
anti-majoritarian decision has retained majority support.
Decisional independence is also crucial to maintaining the rule of
law, which is premised on the notion that no person nor any group of
persons is above the law. What confidence would there be in the judicial
branch if a litigant were to bring a matter before a court with the under-
standing that a decision may be made, not on the basis of facts, law, prece-
dent and logic, but instead on the basis of the external pressures that may
be brought to bear by interest groups? Assurance that cases will be de-
cided "according to law" must be maintained if we are to preserve the rule
of law.
111. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 410 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950), avail-
able at http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffl 270.htm (quoting state-
ment made by Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe in 1776).
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VI. THE JUDICIARY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
If, of course, judges are deciding cases in accordance with individual
value preferences, then the rule of law is equally threatened. Judicial inde-
pendence thus becomes an instrument, not of ensuring the rule of law,
but of destroying it. As Professor Cox has observed, judicial indepen-
dence, therefore, implies a reciprocal obligation on judges to decide in
accordance with a continuing body of principles found in accepted
sources of law.' 2 To illustrate the proper regard for judicial restraint,
Professor Cox relates a remark made to him by Learned Hand when Pro-
fessor Cox was Judge Hand's law clerk:
"[T]o whom am I responsible?" No one can fire me, no one can
dock my pay. Even those nine bozos in Washington, who some-
times reverse me, can't make me decide as they wish. Everyone
should be responsible to someone. "To whom am I responsible?"
[Hand] then turned and pointed to the shelves of his library and
said "To those books about us, that's to whom I am
responsible." 13
Does this mean that deciding "according to law" requires a slavish
adherence to precedent? Absolutely not. What must be preserved, how-
ever, is a sense of continuity in the law. As Professor Cox notes, this can be
accomplished by careful attention to the discipline of legal reasoning, by
which a judge links a new development in the law to an inherited tradi-
tion.' i4 It is not a facile task, but one to which assiduous attention must
be devoted. Deciding according to law implies an approach that by rea-
son, attention to accumulated wisdom, and a sense of 'justice [the judici-
ary] ... evolve [s] the rules best suited to human needs and aspirations."" 5
There must be restraint, not only in the form of respect for existing prece-
dent, but also in respect for the autonomy and the authority of the other
branches of government. Such an approach, of course, is not intended to
please a majority of the people a majority of the time. It is intended, how-
ever, to assure that decisions are not based upon personal values or
preferences.
This approach must necessarily be demonstrated by the highest court
in the land. In 1977, I wrote a law review article that suggested that Su-
preme Court decisions are "'translative of the social philosophies, out-
looks, and predilections of members of the bench."' 1 6 I drew this
premise from a treatise that had been written forty years earlier, entitled
112. See Cox, supra note 8, at 566.
113. Id. at 583-84.
114. See id. at 566-67.
115. Id. at 584.
116. Vanaskie, supra note 102, at 599-600 (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT
OVER CONSTITUTION 96 (1938)).
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Court over Constitution.11 7 This article examined how, in 1968, the Su-
preme Court upheld application of minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements to state and local government employees, but was subse-
quently overruled eight years later, after Richard Nixon made four ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court. 118
Contrary to the express holding of the 1968 decision, the majority of
Justices in 1976 found that the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers
to the states precluded Congress from extending minimum wage and max-
imum hour requirements to state and local governments.11 9 In 1985, just
nine years later, the Court overruled its 1976 decision in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.120 The language of the Tenth
Amendment, considered in all three cases, remained the same. The only
thing that changed was the composition of the Court. Having three sepa-
rate interpretations of the Tenth Amendment in a span of less than twenty
years is at least suggestive of results that depend, not upon judicial deci-
sion-making, but rather on judicial value preferences. Such an approach
is not consistent with the rule of law, which requires stability and fair no-
tice of what the law is.
1 2 1
117. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 96 (1938).
118. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (utilizing commerce
clause to apply minimum wage and maximum hour requirements to states), over-
ruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
119. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855 (overruling Wirtz).
120. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (holding that determination of state immu-
nity from federal regulation does not turn on judicial appraisal of whether particu-
lar governmental functions are "integral" or "traditional").
121. More recently, the Court has used principles of sovereign immunity, and
not the Tenth Amendment, to invalidate congressional exclusion of labor, stan-
dards to state governments. For example, a closely divided Court ruled that the
states sovereign immunity from suit in their own courts was beyond congressional
power. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (finding that Congress could
not abrogate state immunity from private suit in their own courts in case involving
overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). Thus, a Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act case against a state could not be maintained in state courts absent the
state's consent. See id. at 757-58 (determining that Maine did not consent to suit
and could not be sued in its own courts). This ruling followed Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), a five-to-four ruling which held that Congress
lacked the power to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
in federal court. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76. Consistent with the rationale of
these cases, the Court has held that states may not be sued in federal court for
alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act or the Americans
with Disabilities Act. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 960
(2001) (resolving circuit split as to whether individual may sue state for money
damages in federal court under ADA); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67
(2000) (concluding that ADEA did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from suit by private individuals). These decisions reflect the judi-
cial review prerogative established by Marbuiy v. Madison, in which Chief Justice
Marshall wrote:
So ... if both the law and the [C]onstitution apply to a particular case, so
that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disre-
garding the [C]onstitution; or conformably to the [C]onstitution, disre-
garding the law; the [C]ourt must determine which of these conflicting
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The Court's ability to adjust the line of demarcation between congres-
sional and state authority is essential in a constitutional democracy of com-
peting sovereignties. The ability of the Court to redraw the line from time
to time reveals the strength of its independence. However, a constantly
shifting line in the allocation of powers to the national and to the state
governments has the potential to undermine that independence, espe-
cially to the extent that decisions do not reflect careful attention to the
discipline of legal reasoning. 122
Of course, the judges of the inferior courts share the responsibility of
acting according to law. In fact, because they are on the front lines of the
justice system and have the duty to follow existing precedent, their obliga-
tion to act according to law is intensified. Their decisions are in the pa-
pers every day. Their rulings are exposed to public opinion and held up
to public scrutiny as much as if not more so than the decisions of the
Supreme Court. District and circuit judges must constantly adhere to
their limited role, following precedent, not individual preference. As
Learned Hand observed, it is not "desirable for a lower court to embrace
the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in
the womb of time, but whose birth is distant."123
rules governs the case. This is of the very essence ofjudicial duty. If then
the courts are to regard the [C]onstitution; and the [C]onstitution is su-
perior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the [C]onstitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the [C]onstitution is to
be considered, in court, as paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written consti-
tutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles
and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com-
pletely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is
in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and
real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their
powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that
those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest
improvement on political institutions-a written constitution-would of
itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been
viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
122. I have made reference to these cases also because they demonstrate that
judicial activism is not a fault of only the "elitist left," as Graglia laments, but a
criticism that can be leveled at the conservatives as well. Graglia, supra note 105, at
298 (" [T] he effect of rulings of unconstitutionality over the past four decades has
been to enact the policy preferences of the cultural elite on the far left of the
American political spectrum."). Ifjudicial activism is, as Professor Graglia asserts,
"the practice ... of disallowing policy choices by other governmental officials or
institutions that the Constitution does not clearly prohibit," then the conservative
Justices' invalidation of the application of minimum wage legislation to the states
in 1976 was an example of judicial activism. Id. at 296.
123. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND, THE MAN AND THEJUDGE 149 (1994).
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It has been said by one of my colleagues, a district judge from Michi-
gan, that judges themselves pose the most significant threat to the contin-
ued vitality ofjudicial independence.1 24 Decisions that appear to be based
upon a judge's value system, and not according to law, promote assaults
on judicial independence. Such assaults have manifested themselves in
various manners in recent years.
VII. CURRENT ASSAULTS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
One way in which judicial independence has been threatened is
through misleading criticism of particular decisions. There is, of course,
an absolute First Amendment right to criticize any judge's decision. There
is also a First Amendment right to use even intemperate language in call-
ing attention to a ruling with which one disagrees. But the premise under-
lying the First Amendment-that a free and open exchange of ideas and
information will produce the best decisions-can be frustrated by mis-
informed criticism of judicial decisions. Recently, bar associations have
come to the defense of judges by setting up response groups whose re-
sponsibility is to provide, in Paul Harvey's words, "the rest of the story"
when a decision has been subjected to misinformed or deliberately mis-
leading criticism.
Judges, too, must bear responsibility by writing opinions that clearly
express adherence to the discipline of legal reasoning in language that is
understandable to the layperson. Care must be taken that, when prece-
dent is overruled or a gap in the law is filled, the opinion is written in a
way that assures both the litigants and the public that it accords proper
respect to the principle of stare decisis, is justified by the discipline of legal
reasoning and is rooted in the sources of law.
Legislative and executive leaders, however, should refrain from call-
ing for a judge's resignation or threaten impeachment because of an iso-
lated decision. Calls for impeachment or resignation, as we saw during
1996 when a federal judge in New York suppressed evidence, constitute
political threats. 125 The implication is that if the judge does not decide
the case favorably, the judge will lose his position. For nearly 200 years,
the principle has been established that a particular decision is not the ba-
sis for removal of a judge. Calls for removal or impeachment based upon
a single ruling needlessly create inter-branch fiction and, more impor-
tantly, serve to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.1 26
124. See Gerald E. Rosen, Judicial Independence in an Age of Political and Media
Scrutiny, Remarks at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School Distinguished Brief Award Banquet
(July 19, 1997), reprinted in 14 T.M. COOLEY L. Rv. 685, 692 (1997) (noting that
judges must avoid becoming "super-legislators").
125. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (grant-
ing motion to suppress evidence seized from automobile and post-arrest
statements).
126. In Bayless, the judge in question eventually reversed his ruling on a mo-
tion for reconsideration. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217
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A second area in which judicial independence is threatened is
through the appointment process. Having nominees undergo a litmus
test on judicial philosophy suggests that rulings will be consistent with
promises extracted in the confirmation process or that judges are ex-
pected to decide matters in accordance with the predilections of those in
power. The appointment process should, indeed, insure that those quali-
fied by intellectual competence and temperament be appointed; but it
should not be used to assure that only those having a certain philosophical
point of view are confirmed.
A third way in which independence of the judiciary is threatened is
the congressional control over the jurisdiction and organization of the
federal courts. It has been reported that, between 1953 and 1968, more
than sixty pieces of legislation were introduced in Congress to restrict fed-
eral court jurisdiction over particular matters. 127 For example, in re-
sponse to Baker v. Carr128 and Reynolds v. Sims, 12 9 which announced the
one person, one vote rule, proposals were made in Congress to preclude
federal courts from hearing cases seeking reapportionment of state
legislatures. 13
0
Although these efforts were unsuccessful, more recently, Congress has
passed laws that remove federal court consideration of certain matters that
often present issues of constitutional dimension. In particular, the 1996
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act bars judicial
review of many executive agency actions respecting both legal and illegal
aliens. 13 1 For example, the Act provides that no federal court has jurisdic-
tion to consider an executive agency order deporting an alien who has
been convicted of an "aggravated felony."
132
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (vacating prior decision). The implication that the threats of re-
moval affected the judge's ruling is apparent.
127. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on
Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1207, 1220 n.86 (1984)
(citing PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEXLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 360 (2d ed. 1973)).
128. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
129. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
130. See Wilfred Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch": The Tra-
dition of Attacks on Judicial Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 252, 267 (1984) (discussing
Reynolds v. Sims).
131. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
132. See8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (C) ("No court shall have jurisdiction to review
any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having
[an aggravated felony conviction]."); Matthew J. Droskoski, Casebrief, Criminal
Aliens Get Pinched: Sandoval v. Reno, AEDPA's and IRIRA's Effect on Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction, 45 VILL. L. REV. 711, 717-20 (2000) (examining alteration ofjudicial
review after enactment of IIRIRA). The Third Circuit, however, has concluded
that the statutory bar on judicial review does not foreclose habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district courts; thus, an alien may seek judicial
review of constitutional and federal law issues following removal orders, and judi-
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In addition to restricting the federal courts' jurisdiction, Congress has
passed laws that restrict their discretion to decide certain kinds of cases or
issues. For example, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 has significantly
constrained sentencing decisions. 133 Mandatory minimum sentencing
laws turn judges into Jefferson's "mere machine" of the legislature, impos-
ing sentences strictly prescribed by legislation. The Prison Litigation Re-
form Act, also passed in 1996, seriously restricts the relief that judges can
afford for conditions of confinement that amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.'
3 4
This is not to suggest any criticism of these congressional policy
choices. The legislation cited herein had broad public support. But con-
gressional authority does not extend to the adjudication of cases. The per-
tinent question, therefore, is whether Congress is invading the judicial
power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as are established by Congress. If Congress passes legislation that
destroys the essential role of the federal courts, it is violating the separa-
tion of powers doctrine that underlies our constitutional government. For
example, the Constitution's structure would be seriously compromised if
Congress could enact a law and then immunize that law from constitu-
tional judicial review.
From time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would
ordain the result of a particular case. For example, under a recent legisla-
tive proposal, the judiciary would be required to interpret the First
Amendment in such a manner so as to permit the posting of the Ten
Commandments on government property.135 This would be accom-
plished by declaring that the Tenth Amendment should be interpreted as
leaving this choice to state governments.' 36 The bill goes on to state that
cial review may extend to the issue of whether the alien should be classified as an
"aggravated felon." See Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding second misdemeanor conviction for distribution of thirty grams or less of
marijuana without remuneration was not "aggravated felony"); Sandoval v. Reno,
166 F.3d 225, 235 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that district courts continue to have
habeas jurisdiction over deportation orders on basis of commission of crimes listed
in IIRIRA); see also Droskoski, supra, at 728-41 (examining Third Circuit's rationale
in upholding habeas corpus jurisdiction).
133. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1994)).
134. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321-66. The limitation on relief provisions are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
135. SeeJoel L. Thollander, Note, Thou Shalt Not Challenge the Court? The Ten
Commandments Defense Act as a Legislative Invitation for Judicial Reconsideration, 4
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'V 205, 210 (2000) (discussing "Ten Commandments
Defense Act"). In 1999, Representative Robert Aderholt of Alabama introduced
the "Ten Commandments Defense Act" in Congress. H.R. 1501, 106th Cong.
§§ 1201-1202 (1999).
136. See H.R. 1501, § 1202(a) ("The power to display the ten commandments
on or within property owned or administered by the several states or political sub-
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the courts shall exercise the judicial power in a manner consistent with the
foregoing declarations. 137
Plainly, this is a direct invasion of the prerogative of the courts. In
Marbuy v. Madison, Justice John Marshall declared that "it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law iS."138
Congress, therefore, should not pass legislation that tells the courts what a
decision in a particular case must be. 139
While legislation that requires a particular result in a particular case
clearly crosses the separation of powers line, congressional oversight of the
structure and organization of the federal judiciary is appropriate. After
all, funding for the judiciary comes from the general treasury of the
United States. The potential for perniciousness in congressional exercise
of its power over the organization and structure of the federal courts is
present. To avoid constitutional crises arising out of congressional over-
sight of the judiciary, mutual restraint on both branches is necessary. That
is, Congress should not exercise its authority in such a way as to impair
judicial independence, and the judiciary should accept congressional over-
sight in a constructive spirit in order to preserve its institutional indepen-
dence. As stated in the ABA Report on an Independent Judiciary:
If the courts are to make the most of limited resources, it is criti-
cally important that the historically amicable relationship be-
tween the first and third branches be maintained. The judiciary
divisions thereof is hereby declared to be among the powers reserved to the states
respectively.").
137. See id. § 1202(b) (3) (directing courts to interpret First Amendment to
allow posting of Ten Commandments on public property).
138. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
139. This principle was recognized during the Reconstruction Era. Congress
had passed a law providing that individuals whose property was seized during the
Civil War could recover the property or receive compensation for it upon proof
that they had not aided the rebellion. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
128, 130-31 (1871). The Supreme Court held that a presidential pardon fulfilled
the statutory requirement for demonstrating that an individual had not supported
the rebellion. See id. at 131-32. In response to frequent pardons issued by the
President, Congress enacted a statute providing that a pardon was inadmissible as
evidence in a claim for return of seized property. See id. at 133. The statute went
on to provide that a pardon, without an express disclaimer of guilt, was actually
proof that the party had aided the rebellion and would have denied federal courts
jurisdiction over the claims. See id. at 133-34. In holding the statute unconstitu-
tional, the Court stated:
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of
Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate
power.... What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause
in a particular way? ... Can we do so without allowing one party to the
controversy to decide in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing
that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the judicial Depart-
ment of the government in cases pending before it? We think not ....
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power.
Id. at 146-47.
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is usually in a better position than Congress to determine the
most efficient, expeditious and effective means to administer the
courts; hence it behooves Congress to remain attentive to the ju-
diciary's needs and concerns. By the same token, Congress is in a
better position than the courts to structure the nation's policy
preferences and fiscal priorities; hence it behooves the judiciary
to be sensitive to those priorities when communicating its own
needs and concerns. 1 40
Another way in which the independence of the federal judiciary is
threatened is by control of judges' compensation. Although the Constitu-
tion guarantees that compensation may not be reduced, it affords no as-
surance that it will keep pace with inflation. The erosion of independence
attending the real decline in pay attributable to inflation was recognized
by Alexander Hamilton:
It will readily be understood that the fluctuations in the value of
money and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate of com-
pensation [for judges] in the Constitution inadmissible. What
might be extravagant today, might in half a century become pe-
nurious and inadequate.
14 1
However, no provision in the Constitution was made to assure increases in
compensation, with the matter being left to the discretion of the legisla-
ture and the veto power of the President.
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989142 was supposed "to create an auto-
matic, irreversible COLA-granting mechanism for federal judges, contin-
gent only upon the grant of a [cost-of-living adjustment ("COLA")] to the
General Schedule [of federal employees]." 1 4 3 Since 1993, however, Con-
gress and the President blocked COLAS in five of eight years. 144
Congressional failure to abide by commitments made in the 1989 Eth-
ics Reform Act makes it difficult to retain and recruit the caliber of per-
sons needed to discharge the important responsibilities of the federal
judiciary. Chief Justice Rehnquist reports that during the 1990s, fifty-four
federal district and appellate court judges left the bench, a substantial in-
crease over similar periods of time. 14 5 Adequate compensation is neces-
140. Geyh, supra note 22, at 53.
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 44, at 107.
142. Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 101-505 (1994)).
143. Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
144. See William H. Rehnquist, 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciay,
THIRD BRANCH, Jan., 2001, at 1, 3 (noting that federal judges received 2.3% in-
crease in 1998, 3.4% increase in 2000 and 2.7% increase in 2001).
145. See id. at 2. A "white paper" presented to ChiefJustice Rehnquist in Feb-
ruary of 2001 by the ABA and the Federal Bar Association ("FBA") reported that,
of the judges leaving the bench, thirty-one entered private practice. See A.B.A. &
F.B.A. FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION, A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR REFORM 15 n.46
(Feb. 2001) [hereinafter A.B.A. & F.B.A. Report].
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sary also to assure that those attracted to the federal judiciary are the most
fit to be chosen, and not only those most willing to serve. 146 The congres-
sional failure to abide by commitments made in the 1989 Ethics Reform
Act also results in inter-branch friction. Indeed, the validity of the legisla-
tion blocking pay raises in four out of five years is currently being
litigated. 147
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, has called upon Congress to "abandon the approach to judicial
salaries that puts off the inevitable increases until salaries have so eroded
that substantial increases are necessary."148 Specifically, he advocates res-
toration of the blocked COLAs, thereby increasing judicial salaries by
9.6%, and providing assurances that future Ethics Reform Act increases
for the judiciary be automatic.' 49
Establishing a consistent and routine method for compensating
judges would lessen inter-branch friction and avoid the unseemly appear-
ance of judges going to Congress with hat in hand to plead for fair com-
pensation. The American Bar Association (ABA) and Federal Bar
Association (FBA) have concluded that "the current salaries of Federal
judges have reached such levels of inadequacy that they threaten to impair
the quality and independence of the Third Branch." 1 50 Congress and the
President bear a responsibility to ensure the independence of the Federal
judiciary, and that responsibility is not discharged by subjecting judges to
the vagaries of the political processes when it comes to establishing and
maintaining a fair level of pay.
146. See Rehnquist, supra note 144, at 2 ("In order to... attract highly quali-
fied and diverse federal judges . . . we must provide them adequate compensa-
tion."). When I was interviewed by an ABA representative in connection with my
potential nomination to the Bench, I was asked whether I could afford the position
in view of the fact that I would not be earning what I had made in private practice
and I had three children who were not yet of college age. This was a legitimate
question and a matter about which the interviewer had an understandable con-
cern. The person who conducted the interview related to me that he had turned
down an opportunity to go on the federal bench during the Carter Administration
precisely because of the financial demands of paying for his children's education
and the unsettled nature of compensation for judges.
147. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 1023 (reversing summary judgment granted to
judges who filed class action seeking declaration that statutes barring payment of
automatic adjustments to judges did not operate to prevent payment of adjust-
ments due federal judges under Ethics Reform Act of 1989). Senior DistrictJudge
John Garrett Penn had ruled in favor of the judges' position that Congress could
not block COLAs that the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 assured the federal judiciary
whenever Congress decided to give General Schedule employees a COLA. See id.
at 1023. The Federal Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, disagreed, holding that
under United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), Congress could rescind a COLA so
long as it acted before the COLA went into effect. See id. at 1039-40.
148. Rehnquist, supra note 144, at 2.
149. See id. at 3.
150. A.B.A. AND F.B.A. REPORT, supra note 145, at i.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Judicial independence has been threatened at various times during
the course of the Republic's history. This article emphasized one pe-
riod-the Jeffersonian challenge in the early 1800s. But there have been
other times when the judiciary has been under attack, such as during the
Jackson presidency and the Reconstruction Era. 15 1 During the era of the
Progressives in the early 1900s there were vigorous debates over the recall
ofjudges and the popular recall ofjudicial decisions.1 52 Judicial decisions
and judges were subject to harsh criticism at that time. In 1908, the ABA
President, Jacob M. Dickinson, observed:
For a long time . . .judgments of courts . . .were received with
the greatest of respect .... If decisions were publicly criticized,
the criticism was generally temperate, addressed to particular
questions, and was not of such a character as to break down in
the minds of the people respect for the judiciary .... Judicial
judgments are not accorded the same respect as formerly. Not a
court, but the courts, are frequently and fiercely attacked ...,
and political parties of all creeds have bowed their heads in rec-
ognition of a discontent. 153
The consequence of such intemperate criticism, he warned, was to "de-
stroy confidence in the courts" and "to make a subservient judiciary." 154
One century after President Dickinson's observations, we are proceed-
ing through a similar period in which misinformed criticism of decisions,
calls for the impeachment and resignation of judges, retraction of grants
of authority to the judiciary and micro-management of the judicial process
may be combining to cause a subservient judiciary. If judicial indepen-
dence is to be maintained, public confidence in the judiciary must be re-
stored. It is the judiciary that is in the best position to promote respect for
its decisions and confidence in its results. 15 5 Judges must remember that
judicial independence is not an end, but only a means to an end-the
mechanism chosen by 'the constitutional structure to insure the rule of
law. Judges must therefore exercise the reciprocal obligation to indepen-
151. President Andrew Jackson, in an act of defiance of the Supreme Court's
decision striking down the forced march of Native Americans from Georgia to
Oklahoma, Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), is reported to have said,
"John Marshall has made his decision now let him enforce it." Zemans, supra note
10, at 625 n.3. It is reported that "[i]n the fractious period following the Civil War,
the President and Congress used the power to determine the size of the Court to
achieve a specific result on a specific legal issue." Burbank, supra note 19, at 322.
152. See Cox, supra note 8, at 577 (stating that progressives sought to limit
judicial power by requiring unanimous votes by justices to invalidate legislation
and providing for recall of judges by popular vote).
153. Geyh, supra note 22, at 65 (quoting Address of the ABA President, 33 RE-
PORT OF THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE A.B.A. 341 (1908)).
154. Id.
155. See Rosen, supra note 124, at 701 (advocating judicial restraint).
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dence, and restrain themselves to rule according to law, in accordance
with the discipline of legal reasoning, and not according to individual
value preferences. The judiciary must value impartiality, thorough analy-
sis and sound reasoning. It has been said that Judge Learned Hand be-
lieved strongly in judicial restraint, not because he thought the
Constitution had to be applied by its literal terms, but, instead, "from a
healthy mistrust of the idea that judges necessarily know better."15 6 By
exercising such restraint, the federal judiciary can preserve the judicial
independence needed to make unpopular decisions that are sometimes
essential to the preservation of the rule of law.
As observed in the Report of the ABA Commission on Separation of Powers
and Judicial Independence, "a public that does not trust its judges to exercise
sound, even handed, independentjudgment, will look upon judicial inde-
pendence-guaranteed by life tenure and an undiminished compensa-
tion-as a problem to be eradicated, rather than a virtue to be
preserved." 1 57 Judicial restraint-by which I mean deciding cases in ac-
cordance with the discipline of legal reasoning, paying careful attention to
the language of the statute or constitutional provision at issue, existing
precedent and accumulated wisdom, coupled with that healthy distrust of
the idea that judges must necessarily know better-is indeed the recipro-
cal obligation of judicial independence. By promoting an understanding
that judicial independence exists to allowjudges to decide cases according
to law, the judiciary will insure the mutual respect, restraint and under-
standing of the other branches of government required to maintain equi-
librium in our system of government.
156. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Foreword to GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND, THE
MAN AND THE JUDGE, at xii (1994).
157. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPEN-
DENCE, An IndependentJucidiary, available at http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judi-
ciary/rappa. html.
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